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Case and Comment

be defended by showing that the accused committed the contemplated
wrongful act in another jurisdiction.
DAVID THOMPSON *
MATRIMONIAL HOME-UNEQUAL CONTRIBUTION-DIVORCF,-DETERMINATION OF INTEREST OF H. AND W.-In the recent English case of Fribance
1
the facts were that H. and W. married in 1933. They bev. Fribance
came tenants of a house in 1940, at which time they had two children.
H. then joined the R.A.F. The only money sent to his family was the
compulsory allotment. Later, an additional family allowance was added
to his pay. H. wrote to W. stating that in order to build up a family
savings account, he would keep the new allowance and send home only
the compulsory payment. W. agreed; she was to go to work, feed clothe,
and house the family from her own income. When, in 1946, H. returned,
he had saved £260. He began turning the bulk of this over to W., who
continued working. In 1950 H. purchased the leasehold in his own name.
W. only contributed £20. In 1952 W. obtained a divorce. She made application under sec. 17 of The Married Women's Property Act, 1882,2. The
Registrar held that W.'s interest in the leasehold was limited to the
£20 that she had contributed personally. It was held on appeal, however,
that each was entitled to a one-half interest. The Court of Appeal stated
that the conduct of the parties showed that their spendings and savings
were for common family benefits.
It was argued that W. would have to prove a legal contract to
succeed, and that if no contract was established, the court must fall
back upon the "savings from housekeeping" case of Blackwell v. Blackwell.3 In discussion of this point Denning L.J. said:
I do not think that line of argument is valid today. A wife is not to be put
to the proof of a contract or gift as if she were a stranger. Romer L.J. made
that clear in Rimmer v. Rimmer when he said that "cases between husband
and wife ought not to be governed by the same strict considerations, both
at law and in equity, as are commonly applied to the ascertainment of the
I
respective rights of strangers". I fully agree with .that observation and
think it is -the correct way of approaching these cases at the present day.4
Denning L.J. applied Rimmer v. Rimmer l as follows:
I put, therefore, the question of contract, gift or trust on one side, and

apply the law as laid down in Rimmer v. Rimmer, supra, and Cobb v. Cobb,

(1955) 1 W.L.R. 731; (1955) 2 All E.R. 696, which I take to be this: If it is

clear that the property . . . was -intended to belong .to the one or other
absolutely . . . or that they intended to hold it on definite shares, ...

then effect must be given to their intention...
In many cases, however, the intention of the parties
simple reason that they never formed an intention:
attribute an intention to them. This is particularly the
assets, by which I mean the things intended to be a
*
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so the court has to
case with the family
continuing provision
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4 See footnote 1 ante at p. 387.
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for them during their joint lives, such as -the matrimonial home and the
furniture in it. When these are acquired by their joint efforts during the
marriage, the parties do not give a thought to future separation.... So long
as they are living together, it does not matter which of them does the saving
and which does the paying, or which of them goes out to work or which
home, so long as the things they buy are used for their
looks after the
joint benefit.8
In BlackweZl, it was held that W.'s savings from a housekeeping allowance did not give her an interest in the bank balance thereby amassed.
Goddard L.J., there, said that "there is no legal right in a wife to retain
savings made out of housekeeping money. Even if there has been an
arrangement between the husband and wife with regard to those savof domestic arrangement can
ings, I am far from saying that this ' sort
7
necessarily result in a legal contract."
The point of the Fribance case is that where a husband and wife
both contribute, say, to the purchase of the matrimonial home, the court
will not determine their respective shares on a strict accounting, but

will apply an equitable principle of equal division.
GEORGE TAYLOR *
PERPETUITIES IN THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY-THE RULE IN WHITBY
V. MITCHELL-AMENDMENT OF THE LAW IN BRITISH COLUMBIA.-A
recent amendment to the British Columbia Laws Declaratory Act
(R.S.B.C. 1957, c. 33, assented to March 28, 1957), (1) abolished the
common law rule of Whitby v. Mitchell relating to future interests, and
(2) provided that in the case of a future interest in a will, settlement
or other instrument where vesting is dependent on the attainment by

the beneficiary of an age exceeding twenty-one years, the will or instrument shall take effect as if the stipulated age had been twenty-one years.
The relevant sections of the statute are as follows:
36 (a) The rule of law prohibiting the -limitation, after a life interest to
an unborn person, of an interest in property to the unborn child or
other issue of an unborn person is abolished, but without prejudice
to any other rule relating to perpetuities;
(b) Where in a will, settlement, or other instrument the absolute vesting
either of capital or of income of property in, or the ascertainment of,
a beneficiary or class of beneficiaries, is made to depend on the
attainment by the beneficiary or any member or members of the
class of an age exceeding twenty-one years, and thereby a gift to
that beneficiary or class, or any member thereof, or any gift over,
remainder, executory limitation, or trust arising on the total or
partial failure of the original gift, is, or but for this sub-clause would
be, rendered void for remoteness, the will, settlement, or other instrument takes effect for the purposes of such gift, gift over, remainder,
executory limitation, or trust as if the absolute vesting or ascertainment aforesaid had been made to depend on the attainment by the
beneficiary or such member or members of the age of twent-one
years, and that age is substituted for the age stated in the will,
settlement or other instrument.

6 See footnote 1 ante at p. 387.
7 See -footnote 3 ante at p. 580.
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